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Abstract
Understanding how, why, and whether the trade-offs and tensions around simultaneous
implementation of the Sustainable Development Goals are resolved both sustainably
and equitably requires an appreciation of power relations across multiple scales of
governance. We explore the politics and political economy of how the nexus around food,
energy, and water is being governed through initiatives to promote climate-smart agricul-
ture (CSA) as it moves from the global to the local. We combine an analysis of how these
interrelationships are being governed (and ungoverned) by key global institutions with re-
ﬂection on the consequences of this for developing countries that are being targeted by CSA
initiatives. In particular, we look at Kenya as a country heavily dependent on agriculture, but
also subject to some of the worst effects of climate change and which has been a focus for a
range of bilateral and multilateral donors with their preferred visions of CSA. We draw on
strands of literature in global environmental politics, political ecology, and the political
economy of development to make sense of the power dynamics that characterize the multi-
scalar politics of how CSA is translated, domesticated, and operationalized in practice.
We currently lack global governance institutions and processes in the area
of food and agriculture capable of addressing the interrelationships between
the global food system, on one hand, and environmental challenges around
water, energy, and climate change, on the other. Instead, fragmentation persists
across institutions and agencies with responsibility for these areas, despite grow-
ing acknowledgment of the complex interlinkages that characterize the nexus
around water, energy, and food (WEF) in particular. The urgency of addressing
these issues is underscored by the recognition that the Sustainable Development
Goals (SDGs) cannot be achieved in isolation from one another. To simulta-
neously and effectively achieve goals 2 (hunger), 6 (water), 7 (energy), 13 (climate
change), and 15 (life on land) presupposes an institutional capacity and willing-
ness to act on and govern those relationships in more integrated ways across
all levels of governance from the local to the global, crossing scales and sectors
(United Nations Environment Programme 2007).
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Practitioners and scholars alike face a huge challenge in understanding
whether, how, and why the trade-offs and tensions around implementing the
SDGs are resolved both sustainably and equitably. We argue that such an
understanding requires an appreciation of power relations across scales of
governance and their interaction. We document these relations of power and
suggest analytical tools for comprehending them. We focus on how the nexus
around WEF is being governed through initiatives and policies to promote
climate-smart agriculture (CSA) that hold the promise of triple wins by simul-
taneously increasing productivity, lowering greenhouse gas emissions, and en-
abling a more climate-resilient agricultural sector. The increasingly powerful
discourse of CSA draws attention to the interdependence of food and agriculture
with the climate system. Yet beyond technical ﬁxes, it provides few clues about
how to address effectively the integrated and intersectoral focus the SDGs require.
This presents challenges for local, national, and global governance systems accus-
tomed to dealing with these issues in isolation rather than addressing the ways in
which they impact one another. It generates challenges in terms of moving from
the horizontal governance of fragmented and siloed sectoral decision-making to
ecological governance, where decision-making has to anticipate and take account of
ecosystemic interconnections and reconcile the multiple resource dependencies
implied by particular policy pathways. But it also generates challenges in terms
of vertical governance and what we refer to in this article as the triple disconnect
between the global, national, and local scales as the trade-offs inherent in dealing
with the political and ecological connections between SDGs are negotiated across
levels of authority. Thus, despite an international policy arena saturated with
rhetoric around integration, political discussion of how these trade-offs are
handled in practice has been lacking. As Rai and Fisher (2016, 7) observe, “further
research is needed into the role of national and local politics in climate change
responses in LDCs, and in particular how the mitigation, adaptation and devel-
opment agendas can be brought together in these contexts.”
This article combines analysis of how these interrelationships are being
governed by global institutions, such as the Food and Agriculture Organization
(FAO) and the World Bank, with reﬂection on the consequences of this for
developing countries that are being targeted by particular CSA initiatives. To
illustrate these dynamics, we explore the case of Kenya, which has been the
focus of a range of bilateral and multilateral donors with their preferred visions
of CSA. The research is informed by semistructured interviews in Kenya, direct
participation in the development of the country’s national CSA strategy, partic-
ipant observation in side events at the so-called ‘action for agriculture’ CoP
(Conference of the Parties to the United Nations Framework Convention on
Climate Change [UNFCCC]) (CTA 2016) in Marrakech in 2016, and discussions
and personal communications with key global actors in CSA initiatives.
Our approach invites questions about how, why, and for whom CSA is
being governed as it moves across scales, as well as reﬂection on the implications
of this for more sustainable pathways and inclusive responses to the challenges
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of promoting food security in a warming world. We show how different out-
comes are produced once refracted through intra and trans-state negotiations
over how to manage the trade-offs and conﬂicts inherent in realigning differ-
ent agricultural development pathways in response to the threat of climate
change. In empirical terms, we make a contribution to emerging literatures on
the SDGs and the politics of their implementation and to debates about CSA by
looking at a case of SDG implementation in a context in which they have yet to
be studied.
We suggest that the language of synergy and integration around the SDG
objectives belies the reality of institutional jockeying for position between global
governance institutions at the international level, among governmental depart-
ments at the national level, and between national and local government actors
who seek to position themselves to beneﬁt from new resource ﬂows associated
with climate ﬁnance and the SDGs. We argue that this competition tends to re-
produce siloed policy practices. In relation to CSA, discourses of synergy and
triple wins frame the issue as one of better understanding the links between
interrelated environmental challenges and optimizing policy, which serves to
downplay the conﬂicts between competing policy objectives. This obscures the
contradictions and tensions, in ecological and social terms in particular, of pur-
suing these goals in tandem and results in these challenges being passed down
to the local government and project level for their resolution. In relation to
CSA, this manifests itself in the prior commitment to an export-led model of
industrial agriculture without taking seriously whether the water, land, and
energy inputs required to sustain such a model are compatible with the climate
objectives of decarbonizing the global economy, or SDG objectives around
securing land tenure and improving access to water. Instead, we show that inter-
ventions from donors and multilateral development banks (MDBs) and regional
initiatives, such as the Comprehensive African Agricultural Development Pro-
gramme (CAADP) in Africa, serve to lock in and entrench a private and market-
ledmodel of agricultural development that has the potential to impinge negatively
on the achievement of the SDGs around improved access to water and energy
for the poor and security of land tenure.
But the process we describe is not a one-way, top-down imposition of a
particular (neoliberal) approach to CSA, as demonstrated by the discussion of
CSA implementation in Kenya. Competition between agencies, differing inter-
ests, and the very ambiguity of CSA, which allows corporate and global gover-
nance actors to label diverse technologies as “climate-smart” (Newell and Taylor
2018; Taylor 2018), also create opportunities for national and local government
ofﬁcials to acquire authority and resources by invoking the label “climate-
smart.” In other words, across governance scales, a series of accommodations
and negotiations take place when global and regional imperatives are brought
into play with local political dynamics where they assert their preferred readings
of CSA and the policy approaches and technologies by which it can best be
achieved.
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Theorizing the Governance of Food and Agriculture in a
Warming World
How can we best account for the governance of CSA across scales? First, in
terms of the horizontal governance of the interface between climate change
and the food system among global governance institutions, we describe and
analyze how a regime complex around food, agriculture, and climate change
contributes to the formation of a discourse coalition organized around a dom-
inant interpretation of CSA, despite deep ambiguities around the substance of
CSA approaches. Here regime complexes are loosely coupled sets of regimes
involving actors, institutions, and networks, public and private, that govern in
particular issue areas. This allows for the tracing of the relationships and dy-
namics between actors within the complex. Analyses of such complexes have
been produced for genetic resources (Raustiala and Victor 2004), food security
(Margulis 2013), and climate change (Keohane and Victor 2011) as well as for
the institutions within the climate change, food, and agriculture arena under
the banner of CSA (Newell and Taylor 2018).
However, to understand how trade-offs around food, land, water, and
energy are managed, it is necessary to draw on critical accounts of power in
global governance (Barnett and Duvall 2005; Clapp and Fuchs 2009) that seek
to explore why some institutions prevail over others. This provides us with a
point of departure for understanding the horizontal ﬂows of power between
global governance institutions and the inequities and imbalances between
them, for example, why some framings of CSA predominate over others and
how and why global institutions engage with CSA to enhance their proﬁle
and legitimacy and to secure new revenue streams. Discursive approaches would
draw attention to the existence of a discourse coalition around CSA at the global
level, deﬁned as “the ensemble of a set of story lines, the actors that utter these
story lines, and the practices that conform to these story lines, all organized around
a discourse” (Hajer 1997, 47). But it is still necessary to account for the material
power of those actors who are part of the discourse coalition around CSA to
understand why the preferred framings of more powerful actors predominate.
To explain why certain framings and ideologies prevail over others re-
quires a deeper and more multidimensional reading of power, including its
structural elements, than is afforded by liberal institutionalist analysis of re-
gimes (Strange 1983). Literatures on “food regimes” provide useful insights in
this regard (Friedmann 2016; McMichael 2016), locating the governance of
food and agriculture within broader historical cycles in the organization of
the global capitalist economy (McMichael 2009). This helps to explain the cur-
rent dominance of a “market-liberal” approach to reconciling climate change
and agriculture and moves toward the transformation of food and agriculture
along neoliberal lines, as described in the next section.
Second, we engage with work on the “politics of translation” (Newell 2008)
and the domestication of global commitments to sustainable development
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across multiple governance scales. This work builds on rich literatures in GEP on
the domestication of global commitments at the national level (Schreurs and
Economy 1997) and on the interplay between the local and global governance
of the commons (Agrawal 2012). Here the term polycentric governance has been
used to describe how a given policy or intervention blends together actors across
different scales of implementation that fuse the agency and funds of public and
private actors (Cole 2015; Sovacool et al. 2017). Interventions around CSA pro-
vide a clear illustration of how a global concept travels across governance scales
and is altered in the process, mediated and refracted through national and sub-
national institutions and political cultures where there is scope for agency on
the part of national and local elites to rework global agendas to their advantage
and in line with domestic priorities.
Third, by emphasizing the politics and power relations that run through
this process, the article strengthens insights from applying global political ecol-
ogy to GEP (Newell and Bumpus 2012; Sovacool et al. 2017), political ecology
and political economy to climate change adaptation in particular (Sovacool
and Linnér 2016; Taylor 2015), and to climate-resilient and climate-compatible
development in general (Nunan 2017; Rai and Fisher 2016). We highlight the
value of political ecology approaches that “situate local processes within a multi-
scalar series of causal forces” (Taylor 2015, 5). Our analysis afﬁrms the ﬁnding in
this literature that local actors can, at times, navigate spaces of contestation to
govern resources, advance rights, and access claims in ways that align with their
priorities despite national, regional, and global disciplinary pressures to pursue a
preferred pathway. This reveals the more unruly and political nature of nego-
tiations around SDG implementation than suggested by the depoliticizing lan-
guage of synergy and consensus. In this sense, our argument reinforces Taylor’s
(2015, xii) argument that the consequence of the “biopolitical impetus to make
climate change governable … lends itself to a technocratic politics that seeks to
contain the perceived threats posed by climate change within existing institutional
parameters.”
Finally, taking the case of Kenya, we draw on insights from the polit-
ical economy of development to show that the ways in which trade-offs
between SDGs are resolved is a function of factors such as a country’s loca-
tion in the global political economy (e.g., level of aid dependence and
ﬂows of foreign direct investment [FDI]) and how much policy autonomy
exists to address the tensions inherent in the SDGs in ways that accord with
domestic priorities rather than the preferences of donors and transnational
agribusiness actors (Gallagher 2005). Different national policy processes
structure the possibilities and openings for global governance actors to shape
priorities and implement projects. Where they are heavily aid dependent and
tied to the agendas of development banks, it becomes easier to understand
how the predominance of market-liberal framings that we observe globally
gets replicated regional and nationally through CAADP and national CSA
strategies.
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Food and Agriculture in a Warming World
From SDGs to CSA
Fifteen years after the launch of the Millennium Development Goals, the
international community announced the seventeen SDGs, distinguishable by
their focus on sustainability and the agreement that the goals would be uni-
versally applied. Perhaps most notably, the SDGs are novel because of the extent
to which the goals are framed as “integrated and indivisible” (United Nations
2015), breaking down the traditionally siloed approach. Consequently, while
there has been growing emphasis on “synergies” and “nexuses,” the SDGs serve
as a watershed for the signiﬁcance of this approach. However, meeting the SDGs
simultaneously brings into sharp relief the trade-offs between them and pre-
sents potentially unprecedented challenges for governments in terms of how
to design policies and processes that afford a holistic view of their interaction
and impact on other resource areas. As Biermann et al. (2017, 26) put it, “while
the SDGs hold a great potential, their collective success will depend on a num-
ber of institutional factors, such as the extent to which states … strengthen re-
lated global governance arrangements, translate the global ambitions into
national contexts, integrate sectoral policies, and maintain ﬂexibility in gover-
nance mechanisms.” Moreover, the capacity of states to implement global goals
in response to interconnected global crises such as the crisis around food and
energy is further called into question by Sexsmith and McMichael (2015, 581),
who point to “an epistemic blind spot that foregoes an opportunity to reorient
planning to accommodate the global dimensions of these crises.”
Indeed, despite the compelling nature of synergy and nexus thinking, a
number of scholars have sought to caution about the effectiveness of such ap-
proaches.Cairns andKrzywoszynska (2016) have argued that the nexus has become
a new buzzword, combining ambiguity of meaning with strong normative reso-
nance to express an “integrative imaginary,”while assuming that policy integration
is both desirable and possible. In relation to CSA, there is similar concern that the
triple-win rhetoric serves to downplay the conﬂicts between competing policy ob-
jectives and obscures the contradictions and challenges associated with them
(Newell and Taylor 2018). Furthermore, as Weitz et al. (2017, 165) argue, while
the WEF nexus literature identiﬁes barriers to achieving coherence, it “does not
clearly explain why the barriers are present, what inﬂuences them, and how they
can be acted upon. These gaps disconnect the nexus literature from the governance
processes it ultimately seeks to inﬂuence.” Our contribution supports the work of
those scholars who suggest that the key barriers to policy coherence include the un-
equal distribution of power, voice, access to information, resources, and capability
among actors and institutions that inevitably derive from a political process of nego-
tiation among unequal partners (Allouche et al. 2014). By looking at these dynamics
across scales, we challenge the way in which the “non-linearity and complexity of
governance and decision-making … tends to be ignored” (Weitz et al. 2017, 166).
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Climate-Smart Agriculture: Emergence and Debates
CSA, which was ﬁrst articulated in 2009 in an FAO publication (Mann et al.
2009), emerged as a way to square the goals of climate change mitigation and
adaptation with the need to increase productivity in the agricultural sector through
the promise of a “triple-win solution.” It is not hard to understand why this is
thought to be necessary. Agriculture is directly reliant on natural resources and
the climate, consuming some 70 percent of global freshwater and occupying
40 percent of global land area (Braimoh 2013). However, it is among the most
signiﬁcant contributors to climate change, accounting for 56 percent of global
non-CO2 greenhouse gas emissions through the production of methane and
nitrous oxide (Vermeulen et al. 2012). Globally, 2.5 billion people depend on
agriculture for their livelihood (Food and Agriculture Organization 2013b), and
it is a mainstay of employment in sub-Saharan African countries like Kenya,
employing more than 80 percent of the rural workforce, yet is also one of the
sectors most vulnerable to the effects of climate change (World Bank and CIAT
2015). Given the importance and vulnerability of water and energy inputs in
food production, attempts to deliver CSA in practice afford useful insights into
the governance of the nexus around WEF and the ways in which trade-offs relat-
ing to the relevant SDGs are handled or overlooked.
The CSA paradigm has gained such momentum that it has become the
key concept for organizations working at the nexus of climate change, agri-
culture, and development (Taylor 2018; Clapp et al 2018). Despite the un-
doubted value of trying to locate projects that help reduce rural poverty,
and to do so in a way that is less carbon intensive and more resilient to the
effects of climate change, the paradigm of CSA has received signiﬁcant cri-
tique. For example, it is ambiguous when it comes to specifying particular
techniques for sustainable agriculture, despite claims that it constitutes “a
new approach … to guide the needed changes of agricultural systems” (Food
and Agriculture Organization 2013a, 27). CSA serves as a broad discursive
umbrella to accommodate differing agendas, aligning itself broadly with pre-
existing approaches like sustainable intensiﬁcation and agroecology by em-
phasizing their shared goal of integrating climate change imperatives with
agricultural productivity, while obscuring their substantive differences (Newell
and Taylor 2018). It has also been critiqued for failing to adequately recognize
trade-offs. The three pillars of CSA (adaptation, mitigation, and increasing
productivity) are very loosely deﬁned, and there are no set metrics for monitor-
ing progress in any of these domains. Consequently, mitigation can be deﬁned
in CSA variously as total GHG emissions reductions or as GHG intensity reduc-
tions, and in some iterations of the concept, it is described merely as a co-beneﬁt
to be addressed “where possible” (Food and Agriculture Organization 2013a). For
critics, this ambiguity allows agribusiness interests to “greenwash” technologies
and tools, such as genetic engineering, biochar, and biofuels, as being climate
compatible (GRAIN 2015).
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The Global and Regional Landscapes of CSA: Horizontal Governance of
Climate and Agriculture
As noted previously, the regime complex for climate change and agriculture
provides a point of departure for understanding the horizontal ﬂows of power
between global governance institutions and the inequities and imbalances be-
tween them. The CSA regime complex spans multiple governance actors, rang-
ing from the UN climate regime to multilateral environmental organizations,
such as the Consultative Group on International Agricultural Research (CGIAR)
research consortium and civil society organizations (Newell and Taylor 2018).
The complex is also notable for the extent to which it incorporates organizations
critical of some framings of CSA but that lack sufﬁcient power to challenge the
dominant discourse coalition. This diversity within the complex is key to its abil-
ity to accommodate criticism and bolster its legitimacy by building consensus
and stability for dominant framings.
In analyzing the distribution of power between actors, it is clear that the
FAO, World Bank, and CGIAR are the most signiﬁcant institutions when it
comes to advancing policies and inﬂuencing the debate on CSA. For example,
the FAO founded three of the landmark programs for advancing CSA: Mitiga-
tion of Climate Change in Agriculture, Economics and Policy Innovations for
CSA (EPIC), and the most well known, the Global Alliance for Climate Smart
Agriculture (GACSA). These programs are also heavily underpinned by other
UN institutions, such as the United Nations Development Program, while the
most recent UNFCCC CoP 22 in Marrakech served as a showcase for the new-
found proﬁle of agriculture as a critical site for the adaptation to, and mitigation
of, climate change. Throughout, one of the key vehicles for the promotion of this
work is the CGIAR and its numerous partner research centers as well as its research
program focusing on Climate Change, Agriculture, and Food Security (CCAFS).
Through these means, the UN institutions and CGIAR-afﬁliated research bodies
make up a closely connected network of actors and institutions that exert signiﬁ-
cant inﬂuence over the research agenda on climate change and agriculture.
This is not to suggest, however, that the dominant framing of CSA is un-
contested. Different degrees of emphasis are placed on the role of the private
sector between the GACSA program of the FAO and the “4 par 1000” soil carbon
sequestration program launched at CoP 22 by the French government, for exam-
ple. There have also been responses to a number of the early critiques of the CSA
approach, such as increasing the attention paid to the equity and gender com-
ponents of CSA (Collins 2018). The CCAFS Phase II programmatic structure
also now devotes two additional “learning platforms” to addressing “CSA, gender
and social inclusion” (Climate Change, Agriculture, and Food Security 2016).
Moreover, CCAFS appears to be shifting away from the maxim of the triple win
to a more ﬂexible and holistic approach that seeks to build on synergies and co-
beneﬁts wherever possible but that is notably less simplistic. This is exempliﬁed
in recent publications led by CCAFS authors who acknowledge that “it is very
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unlikely that there are silver bullets that can deliver ‘climate smartness’ in all
contexts” (Thornton et al. 2017, 149). A CCAFS representative in an open forum
similarly acknowledged that “triple wins are not always possible, two is enough,
three is great.”1
These attempts to accommodate critique provide insights into how the
CSA regime complex legitimates itself and retains an underlying purpose de-
spite the fragmentation between actors. In particular, the “clever ambiguity” of
the particular deﬁnitions and metrics of CSA (Lilliston 2015) and the limited
evaluations of projects to date (Arakelyan et al. 2017) smooth over the frac-
tures and disparate interpretations between institutions and hold together the
loose coalition behind CSA. Thus, despite these adjustments in rhetoric, a very
broad consensus remains around climate-prooﬁng existing agricultural strategies
and expanding the development and uptake of practices labeled as “climate-
smart.” The enabling environments to support these interventions are those con-
sistent with the further commercialization of agriculture, such that any latent
indictment climate change poses to the agro-industrial system disappears from
view. As Taylor (2015, 99) observes, “for the institutions of global governance,
climate change simply conﬁrms what they already knew. Agriculture in the develop-
ing world needs to become more intensive, efﬁcient and technologically advanced.
To do so, it needs better integration into internationalized circuits of commodity ex-
change.” As successive World Bank (2007, 2009) and International Fund for Agri-
culture and Development (2010) reports make clear, climate-resilient agriculture
is to be achieved through “sustainable intensiﬁcation,”market expansion, and live-
lihood diversiﬁcation. Therefore, structurally, the power across the regime complex
continues to residewithmajor institutional actors, bilateral andmultilateral funding
organizations responsible for ﬁnancing CSA, and the private sector, because of their
required buy-in to the approach as the primary implementers of CSA projects.
Regional Governance
At the regional level in Africa, another set of actors plays a key role in advocating
certain agricultural pathways over others. Framings of the need to “modernize”
and industrialize African agriculture and to “scale-up agro-based industry and
commerce” run through policy documents and reports of regional actors, such
as the New Economic Partnership for African Development and CAADP, which
play a signiﬁcant part in guiding national agricultural strategies. These reports
are replete with calls for neoliberal modes of governance, such as public–private
(and private–private) partnerships (PPPs) and the need for positive “enabling
environments for the private sector” to unlock “transformations” and “revolutions”
in African agriculture (African Union Commission 2015). The African Union’s
Malabo Declaration on Accelerated Agricultural Growth and Transformation for
Shared Prosperity and Improved Livelihoods, for example, calls for a doubling of
1. Meeting with CCAFS representative June 7th 2017.
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productivity (focusing on inputs, irrigation, and mechanization). Demands for
“sustainable intensiﬁcation,” agricultural growth corridors, and the “transition into
modern family farms,” in which resources will be used more efﬁciently through
“economies of scale,” take their cue from the World Bank’s emphasis on integrat-
ing smallholders into global agro-food commodity chains (World Bank 2007).
This global integration is seen as necessary in order to “deepen the commerciali-
zation of agricultural production, facilitate more market opportunities for pro-
ducers and allow them to better access investment and technology” (Taylor
2015, 102–3). National Agriculture and Food Security Investment Plans, mean-
while, are the vehicles for aligning implementation and mobilizing ﬁnancing,
which are then reviewed regionally for compliance. Locking in state compliance
is both necessary and consistent with theWorld Bank’s (2007, 8) view that the state
“correctsmarket failures, regulates competition and engages strategically in public–
private partnerships to promote competitiveness in the agribusiness sector and
support the inclusion of smallholders and rural workers.”
Regional institutions in this regard become important conveyor belts for
providing buy-in for the framings of market-liberal global governance institutions.
For example, one of the strategic action areas outlined in the CAADP Implemen-
tation Strategy focuses on “market infrastructure, regional trade and integration
and value chains development,”whereas another relates to enhancing “innovative
ﬁnancing models for increased public and private sector ﬁnance for agricultural
investments along the value chain.” The need to domesticate global trade disci-
plines is explicit in the call to “harmonize trade regimes, measures and standards,
and remove non-tariff barriers within and across regional trade blocs and domes-
ticate and implement regional and continental trade agreements at national level.”
In the latter regard, a Continental Free Trade Area is envisaged. Harmonization is
considered to be key because “inconsistent or non-supportive agricultural policies
at continental, regional and national levels stagnates the pace of transformation”
(African Union, Comprehensive Africa Agriculture Development Programme, and
New Economic Partnership for African Development 2015, 5–22). Although a
nonstate actor (NSA) coalition was formed in 2014 to participate in the CAADP
process involving farmers’ organizations, civil society, and grassroots movements
alongside business and private-sector actors, their role is narrowly conﬁned to
“advocating for best practices” and to “effectively engage the private sector as a
critical partner in transforming African agriculture through policy and institutional
reforms that encourage and support private investments in agricultural value
chains” (African Union Commission 2015).2
This framing of the problems facing African agriculture and the preferred
solutions align with other interventions and initiatives within the region, such
as the New Alliance, Grow Africa, and Green Revolution for Africa, which seek
2. For a more critical civil society perspective from African civil society, see the “Statement of the
African and US Food Sovereignty Summit,” Seattle, WA, October 13, 2014 (Community Alli-
ance for Global Justice 2014).
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dramatic shifts in production, technology, and ﬁnancing, with an explicit pref-
erence for market-led agricultural development. Their diagnosis of the problem
is a deﬁcit of private capital, conducive regulatory and legal frameworks, and
investment in research and infrastructures of interest to investors. These are as-
sumed under the a priori goals of accelerating export-led growth through agreed
commitments to increased expenditure, new infrastructures, and constructing
agricultural growth corridors, as noted previously. While the World Bank, the
FAO, and USAID have actively supported CSA in national-level strategies in
Rwanda, Kenya, and Tanzania, there is little mention of climate change under
the CAADP themes (Morton 2017). Regarding the implications in terms of
energy and water inputs of the imagined leaps in productivity through “sustain-
able intensiﬁcation” and what this means for the ability to deliver on all the
SDGs, there is deafening silence. What this is likely to mean for the simul-
taneous expectations from the SDGs to improve land tenure security and access
to water and energy for the poor is, unsurprisingly, not made clear. The conse-
quence of this is that the way in which the overriding signiﬁcance of agriculture
is reduced to its ability to accelerate growth forms a metanarrative by key global
and regional policy actors that inevitably skews any serious balancing of this
objective with concerns for the social and environmental sustainability of the
new pathways imagined for African agriculture.
Governing Climate-Smart Agriculture in Practice:
Insights from Kenya
Governing CSA in practice is characterized by multiscalar power dynamics and
tensions as policy is translated from the international and regional to the national
and subnational levels. This is further complicated in the case of Kenya by political
devolution and tension between national and county governments. Here we
advance several arguments by following the policy of CSA from the global to
the local, tracing how CSA is domesticated and how international donor agendas
are translated in a domestic context.
One of the most signiﬁcant factors inﬂuencing the domestication of inter-
national policy for an aid-dependent country like Kenya is donor pressure. Two
interrelated issues emerge here: ﬁrst, how this ﬁnance shapes bureaucratic turf
wars in response to funding opportunities, and second, how this can shape pol-
icy itself. Because CSA is associated with major streams of ﬁnance for climate
change mitigation, adaptation, and carbon sequestration, it incentivizes organi-
zations to position themselves to beneﬁt from these new resource ﬂows. In the
Kenyan climate change and agricultural policy context, this is exempliﬁed by
Maina et al. (2013, 15), who argue that donor funding has inﬂuenced local
priorities: “with the potential for existing ODA [Overseas Development Assis-
tance] funds to be relabeled as climate funds (rather than as additional sources
of ﬁnance), an understandable and indeed necessary response is for some actors
to position themselves as worthy recipients.”
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Yet the disconnect between international policy rhetoric around synergy
and triple wins and how policy is being implemented by policy makers is very
clear. Although preexisting agriculture and climate change policies are increas-
ingly being relabeled as “climate-smart” at a national level, when it comes to
implementation, they are referred to simply as best practice. Many interview
participants noted that the original CSA paradigm of the triple win as deﬁned
by the FAO (2013a) has very little resonance with their approaches. For exam-
ple, researchers at a national agricultural research organization acknowledged
that they have been “doing resilience work for many years—the challenge is
in the issue of narrative…. If you get the narrative right then you’re speaking
the same language,” whereas a Ministry of Agriculture (MoA) ofﬁcial noted that
“CSA has become synonymous with best practice agricultural interventions….
Arguably every project in Kenya is climate linked and is therefore ‘climate
smart.’ … Nowadays even the roads have to be ‘climate smart!’”
Despite the power of donor framings, in the case of CSA in Kenya, the
government has been able to carve out a policy space to domesticate the concept
of CSA in its own way. CSA is not interpreted homogeneously across scales and
different contexts. As it moves further from the scientiﬁc and technical lens of
the FAO (Chandra et al. 2017), there is a much broader interpretation of the
meanings of CSA. Beyond the relabeling of a variety of resilience and adaptation
initiatives as “climate-smart,” the government’s Kenya Climate Smart Agricul-
ture Strategy reframes the goals of CSA in the Kenyan context as (1) adaptation
and building resilience; (2) mitigation of greenhouse gas emissions; (3) en-
abling policy, legal, and institutional frameworks; and (4) addressing crosscut-
ting issues that adversely impact CSA (Government of Kenya 2017, 23)—goals
that break away from the core triple win of the original CSA deﬁnition. Here the
ambiguity of CSA facilitates the relabeling of preexisting activities as “climate-
smart” by the Kenyan MoA and other policy makers to better suit the domestic
context. In particular, the Kenyan CSA Strategy highlights the institutional capac-
ity needed to tackle synergies across the climate change and agriculture nexus,
noting the “inadequate CSA knowledge management system to collect, store,
process and disseminate developed knowledge” (GoK 2017, 45) as well as being
cognizant of broader development priorities. In this way, the Kenyan MoA uses
CSA as a platform from which to identify and build exactly the sort of holistic
approach that the original CSA approach had been criticized for lacking.
Turning to policy implementation, it is clear that complex interorgani-
zational and ministerial power dynamics characterize the policy landscape in
Kenya and that the challenge of making climate-smart agricultural policy is testing
existing institutional structures and mandates. Indeed, “inadequate structures in
Intergovernmental relations for implementation of CSA related policies and leg-
islations” and “weak inter- and intragovernmental linkages among other orga-
nizations” (GoK 2017, 40) are highlighted in the Kenya CSA Strategy as
potential threats to the successful implementation of CSA. The key policy actors
in the climate change and agriculture ﬁeld in Kenya are the Deputy President’s
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Ofﬁce and the Climate Change Secretariat in the Ministry of the Environment
(MoE) as well as the Ministries of Finance, Planning, and Devolution and of
Agriculture. Stakeholder interviews revealed that the Deputy President’s Ofﬁce
is seen to have both the greatest interest in climate change and the greatest
ability to mobilize resources. The MoE has the technocrats and expertise,
whereas the Ministry of Finance manages both national and bilateral funds.
However, overall, it is felt that the most signiﬁcant actor is the Ofﬁce of the
Deputy President; as one interviewee put it, “when all is said and done, the
Ofﬁce of the President is key here.” What results is a disconnect between climate
policy and agricultural policy and a siloed working style between ministries
working in this area (Muok et al. 2012). This resonates with Morton’s (2017,
106) analysis of three other African countries where “agricultural stakeholders
have limited participation in national climate policy processes dominated by
environment ministries,” while, at the same time, “agricultural policies may not
give adequate priority to … climate change.”
Devolution now also plays a key role in inﬂuencing the Kenyan policy
landscape, following the introduction of a new constitution in 2010. Although
government ministries have the responsibility to set the policy agenda in rela-
tion to CSA, agricultural policy is an issue that has been devolved to the county
level. Because of this, the ministries at a national level carry no responsibility for
implementing CSA and are solely responsible for developing policy and strategy,
such as the Kenya Climate Smart Agriculture Strategy (Government of Kenya
2017). CSA projects fall to the county level, where they are implemented
through County Integrated Development Plans. Because of this, the national
government does not have to reconcile the triple wins of CSA or deal with
the inconsistencies and disconnects between regional and international policy
and, in many ways, can pass on the baton of mediating between competing pol-
icy goals. As one ministry ofﬁcial put it, “we cannot direct how counties respond
[to our policies].” The impact is that the hard choices of reconciling the triple
wins of CSA are being passed down to a more local level, where more context-
speciﬁc choices can be made but where there is less technical and administrative
capacity. Moreover, given the geographic, ecological, and economic variations
across counties in Kenya, devolving all decision-making to a local level poten-
tially hinders the ability to balance synergies or trade-offs across the agricultural
sector nationally. As Scott (2017, 13) notes, reﬂecting on the context in Kenya
and elsewhere, “even when many responsibilities have been devolved from
central government, imbalances in power and resources between central and
local government could mean that strong coordination leads to more decision-
making at the centre.”
Finally, the fragmentation inherent in the county system can complicate
negotiations with external donors and policy implementation where the global
and local interact, requiring mediation by national or regional institutions. For
example, one of the ﬂagship CSA projects in Kenya is the World Bank–funded
Kenya Climate Smart Agriculture Project, which will provide US$ 250 million to
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a variety of climate change and agriculture initiatives broadly described as CSA
(World Bank 2017). According to one interviewee, the county system made the
negotiations for this project fraught with difﬁculty, due to competing demands
for additional funding: “county governors demanded they get their extension
and upscaling funds…. The World Bank was not amused because people were
behaving like this is a country within a country.” The resulting funding alloca-
tions in the Kenya Climate Smart Agriculture Project demonstrate the perceived
need to build institutional capacity at a county level, providing US$ 24 million
to “Building Institutional Capacity and Strengthening Service Delivery” (World
Bank 2017, 8), thus responding to the concerns noted earlier from the Kenyan
MoA and others about the capacity of counties to implement such policies.
What the Kenya case reveals, then, is how global and regional imperatives
get reworked through intrastate competition between competing state agencies
and their preferred visions of CSA where there is scope to exercise autonomy in
articulating a vision of CSA that departs from the dominant interpretations of
international organizations like the FAO. The trade-offs that are necessarily im-
plied when seeking to implement CSA projects and broader SDGs are brought
into acute relief at the county level and below, where devolution intensiﬁes
struggles over resources and authority. Understanding and accounting for these
dynamics are critical to evaluating how countries will address the challenge of
realizing the ambition of the SDGs in practice.
Conclusions
We have sought to document and account for the ways in which global systems
of food and agriculture and their interrelationships with the climate system are
being governed across scales. Drawing on evidence from Kenya, we explored
how the power dynamics that shape the governance of trade-offs between com-
peting policy goals around climate change and agriculture play out in a partic-
ular regional, and then national and local, context. Combining analysis of both
the horizontal relationships of power that operate among and between global
institutions active in this area, including the World Bank and the FAO most
prominently, and the vertical relationships of power between global and
regional actors and those national governments and counties that are home
to “climate-smart” agricultural projects and programs, we were able to explain
the patterns of governance that we observe. We have seen how responsibility
for delivering the SDGs simultaneously, and for resolving the trade-offs among
them, is globally diffused and often obscured behind the rhetoric of the triple
win when it comes to CSA. Ultimately, however, this responsibility lands in
particular local contexts in the Global South where concrete choices have to
be made about which agricultural pathway to choose and how far it is climate
compatible.
We noted in particular the ways in which dominant framings serve to
read climate change not as an indictment of agro-industrialism but as both a
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potential barrier to accumulation, by raising the costs of some pathways and
technologies, and also an opportunity to generate new sites of accumulation
through the relabeling and promotion of modern agricultural technologies
and market-led trajectories as climate-smart. As Taylor (2015, 104) notes, “the
spectre of climate change is inserted into this vision not as a challenge to its
embedded assumptions but as a conﬁrmation of its existing biases.” There is
resistance to this framing by other global actors, such as NGOs and social move-
ments, and by skeptical governments that seek to rework mantras about CSA in
ways that align with national priorities and preferences and alternative visions
of agricultural development. Without diminishing the material power of donors
and multilateral and regional development banks and agencies that circum-
scribe the developmental space of governments in Africa, the relationship is
not a one-way imposition but rather a negotiation between unequal partners.
Even the best resourced and most vociferously promoted global interventions
look different once translated into diverse domestic political and economic set-
tings and refracted through local institutional processes. Moreover, the very am-
biguity of CSA, which makes it attractive for the purposes of corporate social
responsibility, allows local development actors to play the discursive game by
labeling their own preferred interventions “climate-smart.”
Theoretically, this suggests the need for scholars of GEP to engage in mul-
tilevel analysis to understand how power dynamics operate across scales, not in
linear and uniform ways, but mediated by the nature of institutions and the
material and discursive practices of power. Insights from global political ecology
are useful in understanding the macro–micro power dynamics linking global
environmental politics to local outcomes. Methodologically and analytically,
this highlights the need to ﬁnd ways of understanding and tracing up and down
the consequences of decision-making in GEP for particular regions and groups
of people. Rather than leave analysis at the international level, the challenge is
to read and locate the global locally, and vice versa.
Following the policy in this way also provides a more contextualized and nu-
anced account of how and why countries take up global initiatives, of which
features of their institutions and political economies make them more likely to do
so and more or less vulnerable to pressure from global governance actors. In
understanding these interactions, we drew on ideas about policy autonomy.
Our analysis further suggests the need not to take dominant framings of issues
as given. The reality of how different regions and social groups deal with these
challenges on the ground is often very different from the way projects are
imagined, and discursively constructed, by donors and MDBs. Triple wins,
promoted through CSA, often disguise complex trade-offs around the simul-
taneous pursuit of policy objectives around food and agriculture, water and
energy. Site-speciﬁc research helps to challenge the articulation of policy ortho-
doxies and points to the need for scholars of GEP to do more of this work,
alongside studying what global institutions do, and claim to be doing, as an
end in and of itself.
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